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Maji Maji in the Making of the South1 
 
If the ‘South’ has come to signify poverty and underdevelopment in Tanzania, it 
suggests itself to ask what has been the role of Maji Maji in its creation and 
perpetuation. As we very well know, in Tanzanian nationalist historiography, Maji 
Maji has been seen in a positive light and given pride of place as the earliest 
forerunner of African unity and harbinger of national liberation. But the assessment 
has always had it gloomy side. It has not escaped attention that Maji Maji was brutally 
suppressed and turned an ultimate failure,  the result of which were the spread of 
misgivings and discord, and in social and economic terms, gross depopulation and 
untold human suffering. It can well be thought to have started a long-term downward 
spiral in the areas in which this took place and which now constitute the ‘South’, seen 
in fundamentally different terms from the ‘North’ as Tanzania’s poor and different 
‘other’.2 Yet Maji Maji can hardly be said to figure prominently in the present 
historical self-consciousness of those areas. Nor has it been given much of a place in 
present explanations of Southern underdevelopment, which concentrate instead on 
geographical marginalization, precolonial warfare, colonial and postcolonial 
negligence, or, more recently, villagization.3  
 
In this paper, I discuss the role of Maji Maji in the making of the ‘South’, in terms of 
both image and reality. My discussion draws on the current more general 
reassessment of the role and nature of Maji Maji of which this volume, and the 
conference on which it is based, is a part.4 I put Maji Maji in the larger historical 
context of colonialism in Tanzania and provide my own understanding of what it 
actually was. My aim is to briefly assess its consequences against this backdrop and 
try to bring the story up to the present. My main argument is that Maji Maji indeed 
has had quite significant a role in the making of the South, but it itself was a more 
multifaceted and complicated historical phenomenon than we tend to think: its 
impacts also were complicated and uneven. They were not only immediate but also 
mediated through subsequent colonial and postcolonial policies which were 
implemented differently in different parts of the area. They have become ingredients 
in long and convoluted historical processes. If it appears that we no longer can think 
                                                          
1 This is a substantially revised and expanded version of the paper presented at the Conference Marking 
the End of Centennial Celebrations of the Maji Maji War, August 4-5, 2007, University of Dar es 
Salaam. It represent a critical re-reading of my previous work, most of which has been published in 
Development for exploitation. German colonial policies in Mainland Tanzania, 1884-1914, Hamburg 
and Helsinki, 1994, pp. 229-240. It reassesses the arguments presented there and brings in fresher 
research on Maji Maji as well as ideas from my own on-going research on the developmental history of 
the ‘South’.  I am grateful for the comments by the organizers and participants, especially James Giblin 
and Bertram B. Mapunda. My special thanks for collegial co-operation go to Jamie Monson.  
2 This begs the question of how the ‘South’ is to be geographically defined, especially whether the 
present Songea region should be included. As this is a paper on Maji Maji I obviously deal with 
Songea.   
3 For a discussion on these, see Bernadeta Killian, ‘Impacts of Finnish aid in forestry and rural 
development: Mtwara and Lindi Regions in Tanzania’. Research proposal, 2003. See also J.A.R. 
Wembah-Rashid, ‘Is culture in south-eastern Tanzania development-unfriendly?’, in Pekka Seppälä 
and Bertha Koda, The Making of a Periphery. Uppsala, 1998.   
4 A major landmark of the reassessment is the volume edited by James Giblin and Jamie Monson, 
forthcoming from Brill.  I participated in the project which underlay the volume. This paper would not 
have been produced without its support.   
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in terms of one uniform Maji Maji, then we also must understand its consequences 
and impacts in a more nuanced and differentiated way. Yet I am arguing that there are 
some patterns underlying the events leading to Maji Maji, its course and 
consequences, and they should not be lost from sight. 
 
Interpretations of Maji Maji: one big event or many smaller ones? 
 
In order to rethink the consequences of Maji Maji we have to start with some 
rethinking of the nature of the whole process. What, after all, was Maji Maji? There is 
no shortage of interpretations. An orgy of mindless anti-foreign violence instigated by 
shadowy witch-doctors and too much local brew (German colonist-military 
interpretation)?5 A great native rebellion predicated on ‘economic causes’, which 
constituted the turning point in the German colonial policy in what was to become 
Tanzania and ushered in the new era of reformist colonialism (colonial reformist 
interpretation)?6 A liberation war, the first anti-colonial awakening on the quasi-
national scale of the Tanzanians-to-be, the forerunner of the independence struggle 
(nationalist interpretation)?7 A revitalist, even millenarian, movement, harking back to 
a past golden age (more culturalist interpretation)8 Or a collection of more or less 
interconnected local uprisings and struggles, each arising from local grievances and 
political constellations (postcolonial/postmodernist interpretation)?9 That is, was Maji 
Maji one big unified event on the regional or quasi-national scale, a myriad of local 
disturbances coinciding and overlapping in time and purpose, or something in 
between? Behind all this looms the great moral question: was Maji Maji good or bad, 
or beyond moral judgement? 
 
The abundance of interpretations is, I think, inversely related to the paucity of facts.  
The appearance of Maji Maji as a fairly well studied phenomenon notwithstanding, 
many basic questions are still contentious. Comparing existing accounts and revisiting 
some of the primary sources it becomes evident that there still is a great deal of room 
for argument about the correct and relevant ’facts’ concerning Maji Maji. A basic 
chronology can be sketched from the outbreak of open hostilities in late July 1905 to 
their gradual suppression during 1906 and 1907. But, especially in the early ‘African’ 
                                                          
5 E.g’. Über die Unruhen’, Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Zeitung, 12 August 1905. 
6 The view of the subsequent German governor, Albrecht Freiherr von Rechenberg, and accepted as 
historically valid by John Iliffe in his Tanganyika under German Rule, 1905-1912. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1969. 
7 As famously suggested by Julius Nyerere, when representing the Tanganyika African National Union, 
in his message to the Fourth Committee of the United Nations in 1956, printed in his Freedom and 
Unity. Dar es Salaam, 1966, pp. 40-41. This view has been echoed in most Tanzanian Maji Maji 
scholarship up to the present. 
8 As suggested by more recent Tanzanian and foreign scholarship, affected by German ethnology, such 
as Joseph Safari, Grundlagen und Auswirkungen des Maji-Maji Aufstandes von 1905. Dissertation, 
Köln Universität. Cologne, 1972; and Jigal Beez, Geschosse zu Wassertropfen. Rüdiger Köppe Verlag, 
Cologne, 2003; idem., ‘The Maji-message and its religious influences and consequences’, paper 
presented at Maji Maji Conference, 4-5 Aug  2007, University of Dar es Salaam  (footnote 1 above).  
9 As many more recent contributions argue or imply. See e.g. Thaddeus Sunseri, ‘Famine and Wild 
Pigs: Gender Struggles and the Outbreak of the Maji Maji War in Uzaramo (Tanzania)’, Journal of 
African History 38 (1997): 235–59; idem, ‘Reinterpreting a Colonial Rebellion: Forestry and Social 
Control in German East Africa 1874-1915’, Environmental History 8.3 (2003): 36 pars. 16 Jul. 2004; 
Jamie Monson, ‘Relocating Maji Maji: The Politics of Alliance and Authority in the Southern 
Highlands of Tanzania, 1870–1918’, Journal of African History 39 (1998): 95–120; Felicitas Becker, 
‘Traders, “Big Men” and Prophets: Political Continuity and Crisis in the Maji Maji Rebellion in South 
East Tanzania’,  Journal of African History 45,1 (2004): 1-22. 
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part, many questions remain unanswered. How, actually, did the whole thing start? 
Who were the combatants and what did they think they were fíghting - for or against? 
What was maji and where did it come from? 
 
Historians will recognize this to a great extent as a source problem: the sources from 
which the facts concerning Maji Maji have been extracted are relatively few and of 
questionable reliability, as almost all of them have a particular axe to grind. The 
German colonial records, outwardly the most extensive, most detailed, and most 
reliable sources, document and date meticulously every ‘disturbance’ that came to the 
knowledge of the colonialists as well as the German countermeasures to these. Yet not 
only is such a view culturally very thin but the Germans also were badly out of touch 
with events and often disagreed among themselves. They simply did not know much 
about what was going on; indeed, had they be better informed, the rebellion might 
never have reached the proportion it did. Missionary sources are, in this case, inferior 
to colonialist ones. Missionaries, while ostensibly living near the people, could not 
possibly have known what was going on among the rebellious ‘heathens’ before 
disquieting rumours inevitably reached them on the eve of the imminent attack. Their 
accounts reflect the concerns of survival of a beleaguered righteous minority and 
cannot be expected to provide a realistic assessment of the nature of forces 
threatening their very existence. Oral sources, for their part, originate from research 
undertaken somewhat fitfully in three broad cycles in the colonial and postcolonial 
periods.10 Their great merit, of course, is that they provide the opportunity to hear the 
voice of those actually involved on the African side; whether they actually accomplish 
this is another thing.  The malleability of oral communication and its susceptibility to 
the ‘contaminating’ influence of later written and other authoritative accounts and 
events is well known; and the further they are from the actual events the less original 
information they contain and the more they tend to conflate and telescope several 
historical processes into one. Oral memory is also highly localized; the same events 
can be remembered and assessed very differently in geographically nearby places.11 
 
Yet the problem goes way beyond the sources. The sources have to do with ‘simple 
facts’ and historians are basically interested in ‘institutional facts’, or ‘interpretations’, 
to use the vernacular term. The basic requirement for judging the interpretations is, of 
course, that the interpretation concerned fits the known ‘facts’, or data, better than its 
rivals do and makes better sense of what factually seems to have happened. This 
might be called the ‘knowledge’ or cognitive requirement. But it also goes the other 
                                                          
10 The first cycle was during the colonial period, relatively shortly after the events, i.e. before and after 
the Great War. The most valuable are the work of Father Ambrosius Mayer of the Kipatimu Mission 
and that of the British colonial official R.M. Bell in Liwale. A few years after the events and  
independently of each other, they collected oral information on the rebellion from local Africans who 
had been personally involved. See ‘Wie 1905 im Matumbi der Aufstand begann. Nach Aufzeichnungen 
des P. Ambrosius Mayer’, Gott will es! Nr. 8, 08, 1914, 225-233 and R.M Bell, ‘The Outbreak of the 
Maji Maji rebellion in the Liwale District’, Tanganyika Notes and Records 28 (1950): 38-57. Bell’s 
original manuscript is more detailed but unfortunately the copy in Kilwa District Book at the Tanzania 
National Archives is defective. The two other cycles, the second in the wake of Tanzanian 
independence in the 1960s, and the third in more recent years, will be commented on below. 
11 Telescoping and local idiosyncracies were evident in interviews made in the Matumbi Hills, Kilwa 
and Lukuledi valley in 2004 by a group of Tanzanian and foreign scholars, including myself.  See 
‘Mitazamo mipya kuhusu Vita vya Maji Maji . Kumbukumbu ya mahojiano aliyofaniyika katika 
wilaya za Kilwa, Lindi na Rufiji, Julai-Agosti 2004’. University of Dar es Salaam, History Department. 
The same sort of confusion is apparent in much of the more recent fieldwork, e.g. Becker, Traders, pp. 
21-22.  
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way around. What is taken as a fact and what is not is dependent also on our 
interpretative framework, and interpretations are based not only on facts. They also 
must resonate with the intellectual or political views – whether they are popular or 
academic, and whether we call them narratives or paradigms - prevalent among the 
interpreters at that particular time and place. This may be called the ‘power’ or 
instrumental requirement. Whereas an interpretation can emerge and survive for some 
time relying mainly on one or the other of these sets of requirements, in the long run it 
is the interpretation that fulfils both conditions best that carries the day. For Maji 
Maji, it is no coincidence that colonial and nationalist interpretations in their solidity 
are like mirror images, and both have now been challenged by more fragmented 
postcolonial or postmodern interpretations. 
 
Maji Maji as a unified movement 
 
The traditional understanding of Maji Maji is, of course, that of a unified movement, 
with shared narratives on its outbreak, spread and suppression.12  In its most 
compressed form, the story goes as follows. The rebellion, or war, began in the 
Matumbi Hills north-west of Kilwa in late July 1905. A few local men went and 
uprooted a few stalks of cotton in a ‘government field’ in the village of Nandete. After 
this symbolic act of defiance the rebellious Matumbi attacked the nearby akida seat in 
Kibata and a killed a fleeing German settler. Strengthened by some of their Kitchi 
neighbours, they continued towards the coast, which was reached with the invasion of 
Samanga on the 1st of August. Within a few days, almost all the peoples living north 
and west of Matumbi in the Rufiji valley and the plain south of it were on the 
warpath, the fiercest being the Ngindo. The German Benedictine bishop Cassian Spiss 
and four of his companions were killed on the way from Kilwa to Songea on the 14th 
of August. The following day, the German post in Liwale fell to Ngindo rebels; two 
Germans and six African askari were killed.  
 
During the rest of August the war spread in all directions. In the north, ‘disturbances’ 
were reported in southern Uzaramo and a German force was sent there on the 19th. In 
the north-west, a caravan of the German East Africa Company DOAG was destroyed 
between Ifakara and Mahenge on the 24th, and the hilltop boma of Mahenge was 
attacked by two forces, consisting of some 16,000 Ngindo and other warriors on the 
30th of August. Meanwhile, fighting broke out both in South, in the Lukuledi valley. 
The mission stations of Nyangao and Lukuledi were attacked on the 26-27th of 
August, but the missionaries managed to escape. Other rebel contingents marched 
eastwards and engaged in a series of battles in the vicinity of Lindi town. A few 
                                                          
12 This is best told in John Iliffe’s later account, Modern History of Tanganyika. Cambridge, 1979, ch. 
6. In addition to a careful reading of a wide range of documentary evidence it makes full use of 
Tanzanian oral research, especially that by the late Gilbert Gwassa. Gwassa’s thesis, ‘The Outbreak 
and Development of the Maji Maji War 1905-07’ (Ph.D. diss., University of Dar es Salaam, 1973), 
remained long unpublished and generally inaccessible but has finally been reprinted in Germany by 
Rüdiger Köppe Verlag, ed. by Wolfgang Apelt, Cologne, 2005. Meanwhile, parts of his work reached 
wider audience through articles such as ‘Kinjikitile and the ideology of Maji Maji’  in T.O. Ranger and 
I. N. Kimambo (eds.), The Historical Study of African Religion  ed. (London, 1972), 202-17, and 
‘African methods of warfare during the Maji Maji war 1905-07’, Bethwell A. Ogot, (ed.), War and 
society in Africa: ten studies, London, 1972. The other major source of oral accounts, those of the 
second cycle, also extensively used by Iliffe, is provided by the collection of papers undertaken under 
the supervision of Gwassa and Iliffe in the late 1960s, ‘Maji Maji Research Project, Collected Papers’, 
(MMRP) University of Dar es Salaam, Department of History, 1968-69.  
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Makonde jumbes on the northern edge of their eponymous plateau seemed to have 
joined the rebellion. In Eastern Usagara, caravans were attacked and shops plundered 
by Vidunda rebels in the closing days of August, and the town of Kilosa was attacked 
on the 4th of September. Meanwhile, maji had reached Ungoni and the much feared 
Ngoni had decided to mobilize their war machine against the colonial power. Other 
South Western people joined in. In early September, several tax collectors were killed 
by Pangwa rebels. As the last outburst of unchecked expansion, Bena warriors 
attacked the Lutheran mission of Yakobi on the 19th September.  
 
Thus, in late September 1905, some two months after the first outbreak, Maji Maji, 
understood as a unified rebellion or war, was at its most widespread. Battles 
apparently involved the majority of the peoples south of the central caravan route 
from Dar es Salaam to Kilosa and east of the line Kilosa-Lake Nyasa. Outbreaks of 
violence were feared as far as Mwanza. The loyalty of the African askaris in the 
German Schutztruppe was untested. Fear ‘approaching panic’ reigned in the capital 
and a European citizens’ guard was established.13 
 
The colonial counterattack was gaining force, however. It has its counterstory.14 
Although the German military forces in East Africa numbered barely 2,000 men 
scattered in small units here and there across the vast country, their armament, 
mobility and vision proved superior. Governor Götzen speedily reinforced his troops, 
which moved to wherever new ‘disturbances’ were reported. The colonial riposte 
started in the Matumbi Hills in early August 1905. Fresh soldiers, including European 
marines, were ferried in by German warships from Dar es Salaam. After the early 
weeks’ route the colonialists regained the initiative. The battle of Mahenge is often 
considered as the turning point in the expansion of the war. Yet although the rebels 
failed to take the boma, the Germans were unable to prevent fighting from spreading 
all over. For several months the situation remained unsettled before the superior 
firepower of the colonial forces made its impact. The machine gun was probably the 
decisive factor: the arms of the rebels consisted of out-dated muzzle-loaders, bows, 
arrows and spears, which were a poor match for it. Fighting methods were extremely 
cruel, on both sides. Enemy men were killed, women captured, and cattle confiscated. 
The huts, shambas and granaries of the opposite side were burnt down.15 
 
The rebels advanced boldly on the colonial forces, relying on the protective force of 
the maji medicine. It must have been a nasty surprise that it failed. They suffered 
heavy losses under German fire. ‘They did not know what a machine gun was. They 
thought that the Germans had run out of ammunition and were beating empty tins … 
                                                          
13 A glimpse of the tense atmosphere in the colonial capital is given by Götzen’s dispatch from which 
the quotation is taken. Götzen to Colonial Department, 26 August, 1905, Bundesarchiv, RKolA 
1001/722, 110. 
14 It has been told in detail in German popular historical accounts such as Walter Nuhn, Flammen über 
Deutsch-Ostafrika. Der Maji-Maji-Aufstand 1905/06. Bonn, 1998. These basically draw on Governor 
Götzen’s original account, Deutsch-Ostafrika im Aufstand 1905/06, Berlin, 1909, complemented with 
some archival materials. A much more scholarly account based on German sources is provided by 
Detlef Bald, ‘Afrikanischer Kampf gegen Kolonialherrschaft. Der Maji-Maji Aufstand in Ostafrika’, 
Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, 19 1976), 23-50.   
15 These are described in a variety of sources. See e.g. accounts in Gwassa and Iliffe, Documents; Bell, 
The Outbreak; Bald, Afrikanischer Kampf, esp. pp. 39-41; and original German military reports, e.g. 
Paasche,  ‘Militärpolitischer Bericht über die Tätigkeit der in Ostafrika befindlilichen Kreuzer und 
Marinentruppen’, Dar es Salaam, 7 Dec 1905, BA-Militärarchiv, F 4337/XVII, 15-33/2 
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Far too many people died that day.’16 Open battles were increasingly replaced by 
ambushes and guerilla warfare. By the spring of 1906 this, too, was over except in the 
south-west, where the hard core of the hunted  Ngoni, Bena and Ngindo leaders had 
escaped to the faraway wilderness of Mgende, still today dreaded as an abode of 
witchcraft. The back of the rebellion was broken only at the beginning of 1907, and 
some of its leaders continued scattered fighting until the middle of 1908. Meanwhile, 
not content with military suppression, the German forces enlisted famine as an ally. 
They deliberately laid waste to the houses and fields of the combatants, believing that 
‘only hunger and want can bring about a final submission’.17  
 
At a very high level of generality, the above may be regarded as a fair ‘factual’ 
outline. Yet one does not have to dig much deeper into the narrative before several 
questions arise and one realises that the story of a unified war or rebellion is indeed 
only one interpretation among others and not necessarily the most warranted one: any 
attempt to provide a straightforward account of a web of events and processes as 
complex as this with sources like these is foredoomed. In its simplest form the story 
of one Maji Maji rebellion is how the German top colonialists understood the 
succession of events. Hit by complete surprise, having to divide their meagre forces 
strategically in right proportions across the rebel areas they saw themselves as 
fighting against a common, hydra-headed enemy.  
 
Most colonialists believed that there must have been a conspiracy behind such closely 
timed military actions. A frantic search of masterminds was mounted – to no avail. 
Unable to personify the enemy, maji captured the colonial imagination. It seemed to 
offer a rare insight into the peculiar logic of native thought while it provided the 
tangible unifying factor underlying the string of separate military actions by a motley 
collection of combatants. As Monson has emphasised, maji became a sign of 
rebelliousness and was taken as evidence of participation: whoever had taken maji 
was by definition an enemy.18 Other martial symbols, such as the habit of the rebels to 
attach millet stems to their hands and bodies and the belief that these could also be 
used as anti-white weapons,19 were overlooked. It was the Germans who coined and 
propagated the label Maji Maji, a name that most of the rebels apparently were not 
using themselves.20 
 
Our understanding of the nature and origins of maji, however, and the spirit mediums 
or diviners distributing it on the eve the rebellion remains insufficient at best. The 
Germans thought maji was paramount, yet were unable to agree on where to track 
down its origins. The Tanzanian nationalist interpretation, as promoted by Gwassa 
                                                          
16 Mr Abdulrahman Lipunjo Mandwanga from Kibata, 28 Aug 1967, Gwassa and Iliffe, ed. Records, p. 
21 
17 Capt. Wangenheim, 22 October 1905, quoted approvingly by Götzen, Aufstand, p. 149 
18 Jamie Monson, ‘The Uses of Medicine: Memory, Modernity and Conversion in the Maji Maji War’, 
paper presented at the Symposium on Rethinking Maji Maji, Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin,  
29 March 2005, p. 5. 
19 Kalembo, MMRP 7/68/1/1, p. 7; Mzee Yonas Mtepa, Nkowe, ibid, 7/68/2/3/2, p 1. For similar 
Zaramo beliefs, cf. M. Klamroth,’Beiträge zum Vertständnis der religiösen Vorstellunger der Saramo 
im Bezirk Daressalam (Deutsch-Ostafrika), Zeitschrfift für Kolonialsprachen, 1 (1910-11), pp. 142-143  
20 Götzen speaks of ‘Maji-Maji magic’, mentions that the war cry was ‘maji maji’ and occasionally 
uses the expression  ‘Maji-Maji rebellion’, Aufstand, pp. 47, 233. Oral accounts especially from more 
peripheral areas give ‘honga honga’ (Lindi, Götzen, Aufstand, p. 164) and ‘homa homa’ as war cries 
and names (Kilosa, Chipindula, MRPP 2/68/1/1).   
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and Iliffe, not only upheld the German insistence on maji but elevated it to an 
‘ideology’ and gave pride of place to Kinjikitile Ngwale. This 'very eloquent, brave 
and wise man' (Gwassa) is said to have become possessed by a serpent-like water 
spirit and to have established a shrine in Ngarambe, next to the Matumbi Hills close to 
Nandete sometime in 1904. From there he distributed maji, a concoction of water with 
maize and sorghum grains which was either drunk and/or sprinkled on the body and 
carried away in small bamboo stems. It was a medicine for the fertility of fields and 
protection against predatory animals but it apparently was also more. Kinjikitile is 
told to have conducted a whispering campaign, njwiywila, promising that the year was 
‘a year of war’. An important part of the message was that dead ancestors would come 
back and could be seen in Ngarambe.21 Attracted by such prospects, hundreds of 
pilgrims began to flock to Ngarambe probably in early 1905.  
 
After the outbreak of fighting, the Germans hanged Kinjikitile, together with some 
other mediums. His memory is well alive in both Ngarambe (which is no longer the 
same village) and Nandete, even though he is assessed very differently in these two 
neighbouring places: as a prophet and hero in Ngarambe but a troublemaker and 
swindler in Nandete – a mchumi, an economist.22 Still, Gwassa himself recognizes 
that maji did not originate from Kinjikitile but from somewhere in upper Rufiji23 and, 
as Marcia Wright was first to point out, a re-reading of belatedly discovered German 
sources shows that a host of other mediums and shrines were involved in distributing 
it.24  
 
The wider spiritual context has been known for quite some time but it has been 
difficult to establish proper links to maji. Water medicines and snake spirits were 
nothing new in this part of Africa. There had been an established water cult called 
Bokero or Kolelo, associated with a snake spirit and known to a variety of people 
from the Zaramo to the Luguru and Mwera, and a powerful serpent spirit had been 
recognized over an even wider area.25 The issue is the exact relationship between 
these pre-existing cults and maji as anti-German war medicine: the process by which - 
how, when, and by whom – they were transformed into such.  
 
The story featuring Kinjikitile takes it for granted that he methodologically planned 
for war and had ready-made war medicine right from the beginning; he simply 
universalized and propagated it. This relies heavily on oral evidence gathered by 
                                                          
21 This is mostly based on oral evidence collected by Gwassa in Nadete and Kipatimu in August-
September 1967, complemented by some German sources. It has been widely available in Tanzania in 
Gwassa and Iliffe, Records of the Maji Maji Rising. Nairobi, 1968. 
22 ‘Mitazamo mipya’, pp.  110 ff. 
23 Gwassa, Kinjikitile, pp, 205-209 
24 These sources have been there for a long time but have started to make an impact only after their 
translation into English. They include Otto Stollowsky, ’Ein Beitrag zur Vorgeschichte des Aufstandes 
in Deutsch-Ostafrika im Jahre 1905/06’, Die deutschen Kolonien 11 (1912): 138-43, 170-3, 204-7, 237-
9, 263-6 . This was translated by John East as Otto Stollowsky, ‘On the Background to the Rebellion in 
German East Africa in 1905–1906’, International Journal of African Historical Studies, 21 (1988): 
677–97; and  Winterfeld, ‘Bericht  den zur Erforschung der Ursachen des Aufstandes eingesetzen 
Kommission’, 4 December 1905. Bundesarchiv,  R1001/726/91-92, as quoted by Lorne Larson, ‘The 
Ngindo:  exploring the center of the Maji Maji Rebellion’, mimeo, p. 25. Marcia Wright drew 
empirically on Stollowsky when embarking on a reappraisal of Kinjikitikle’s role in her ‘Maji Maji. 
Prophecy and Historiography’, 124-142, David M. Anderson and Douglas H. Johnson, Revealing 
Prophets. Prophecy in Eastern African History, London, 1995.  
25 Larson, The Ngindo, pp. 19-20.  
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Gwassa in the late 1960s in Nandete and the Matumbi Hills. The evidence can be read 
in other ways as well: protective power over European bullets may have been a very 
recent addition to the functions of the medicine, an emergent amalgam of several 
existing local beliefs. The Matumbi and Ngindo had indigenous madawa, which 
prevented bullets and spears from entering the body.26 A confluence of many different 
medicines is apparent in the 1906 report of a German officer, Captain Merker, 
operating in Matumbi. He thought that what had been distributed in Ngarambe was 
primarily meant to free people from agricultural worries. He remarked that, in 
addition, it also gave invulnerability, ‘acting in such a way that the adversary’s bullets 
would fall from their targets like raindrops’ but was careful to add that this applied 
only to ‘warfare previously customary among the natives’. The same medicine, or the 
grains in it, could be used by women for fertility of their fields and by men for 
gunpowder to improve the accuracy of shooting.27 
 
In the contemporary imagination, the big name was not Kinjikitile but Bokero: 
women’s kanga cloth called ‘Bokero’s eyes’ sold well in southern coastal towns in 
December 1905.28 Bokero, however, is one of those multipurpose names that further 
complicate the identification of the historical actors in Maji Maji (another is hongo, 
see below). Sometimes it referred to a certain medium, in some areas it was the 
designation of the spirit and the whole cult and at times it was used as a generic term 
for all spirit mediums. Kinjikitile, too, could be referred to as Bokero. Germans were 
unable to agree who the greatest Bokero was. It is evident, however, that in addition 
to Ngarambe there were at least two other major distribution centres of maji and 
several smaller ones. Most accounts situate the most important, and original, source of 
maji at (or near) Kibambwe, in upper Rufiji near the Pangani rapids. Regierungsrat 
Winterfeld, sent to investigate the causes of the rebellion, used the name ‘Magumbiro’ 
to refer to the ‘medicine man of Rufiji-Pogoro origin’ active there; it was later re-
spelled as ‘Mkumbiro’ (Bell). He apparently was the Bokero who, together with 
Kinjikitile, was hanged by Germans in Mohoro on the 4th of August 1905.29 Another 
major independent centre for maji was Mabada, where it was distributed by Ngameya, 
one of the few spiritual leaders who later actively participated in military action.  
 
These shrines are physically located far from each other but obviously there was a 
connection; its exact nature is unclear. Mkumbiro and Kinjikitile are sometimes 
mentioned as brothers-in-law. Stollowsky, a German petty official at Mohoro, who 
believed he had detected a sinister conspiracy before the outbreak, thought that there 
was ‘a large family of magicians’ operating over a large area from Rufiji to Matumbi. 
He thought they were coming from the Matumbi Hills; Bell’s Ngindo informants 
claimed later that all three major mediums were ethnically Ikemba, a small people 
who have not figured in Maji Maji historiography. Significantly, a fair share of the 
smaller mediums were women, but few names survive. One is Nawanga, ‘an old 
Matumbi woman’ who was given one year in chains by Stollowsky even before any 
                                                          
26 Gwassa, Kinjikitile, p. 210. Similar beliefs are still active; see e.g. Mzee Abdalla Said Mkogote, 21 
July 2004, Mitazamo mipya, pp. 33 ff.   
27 Moritz Merker, Militär-Wochenblatt, 91 (1906), as quoted in Götzen, Aufstand, pp. 45-46. For a 
slightly different translation, see G.C.K Gwassa and John Iliffe (eds), Records, p. 12 
28 DOAZ, 30 Dec 1905, as quoted in Monson, The Uses of Medicine, p. 8. The kanga bore an image of 
an eye and was ‘worn enthusiastically by coastal bibis’, i.e. elder women.  
29 Based on ‘evidence from a coastal  Negro’, Winterfeld refers to Magumbiro as ‘Bokero Mkubwa’ 
and his son ‘Legitive’ as ‘Bokero Mdogo’, the latter obviously being a corruption of Kinjikitile. In 
Stollowsky’s eye-witness account Bokero’s son was different from Kinjikitile (‘Litigire’). 
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‘disturbances’ had broken out. She was charged with ‘extracting money under false 
pretences’.30  
 
Also,  reliable information on warriors and war leaders is in short supply. Beyond the 
colonial image of hordes of rebels attacking ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ targets alike, and the 
anti-colonial image of Germans retaliating with superior firepower, summarily 
hanging ‘ringleaders’ and ‘magicians’ and wreaking havoc with their scorched earth 
tactics, our general picture of the actors, activities and their background remains hazy.  
Warriors evidently were men, probably of younger and middle generations, 
commonly organized on the basis of clans: clan leaders mobilized their ‘children and 
other relatives’.31 Only the names and careers of a few key leaders are known with 
any certainty and contradictions abound in the accounts.32 Most of these were jumbes, 
local leaders appointed by Germans to double as their agents. Among the Matumbi 
and Kichi, Mkechekeche Kyuta and Ngogota Mhiwa are mentioned. A major figure in 
the Ngindo area was an elephant hunter and rubber collector named Abdullah 
Mapanda, ‘the bravest and most intelligent’ of rebel leaders, who lived in 
Kitandangora, some twelve hours’ walk north-east of Liwale. He was one of the few 
non-jumbe rebel leaders. Jumbe Kapolo of Madaba missed the start but remained 
among the hard core till the bitter end.33 Abdallah Mshimaye, a Ngindo, is 
remembered mainly as the murderer of Bishop Spiss. The man who is commonly 
credited as having taken the war to the South was the Mwera headman Selemani 
Mamba, considered by some colonialists to be the most resourceful and moderate of 
rebel leaders.34 Jumbe Gabriel Mbuu from Rupota emerged as another Southern 
leader of some prominence.35 In Southern Uzaramo, jumbe Digalu Kibasila of remote 
Kisangire, just out of one month’s stint in a colonial prison, was a dominant figure, 
while the warriors in Uvidunda were led by another ex-prisoner, ex-slave trader and 
ex-jumbe Chitalika, a Nyamwezi.  
 
In South-Western kingdoms, the leaders were more easily recognizable. Maji was 
taken over there by the kings and other royals. This was especially evident in the 
northern Ngoni kingdom of Mshope, ruled by nkosi Chabruma Tawete while nkosi 
Mputa Gama of the southern kingdom of Njelu was internally in a weaker position 
and could not convince all of his sub-chiefs, ndunas.36 In Njombe, the moving spirit 
was not the old chief Mbeyela, but his sons Mpangire and Nkozinkozi. A truly 
transregional role was played by the enigmatic figure of Omari Kinjala, a Ngindo who 
brought maji to Ungoni, co-operating with Bibi Mkomanile, a Ngoni nduna whom he 
had married. 
 
Maji Maji as a series of local uprisings  
                                                          
30 Bell, Outbreak, Kilwa District Book, TNA; Stollowsky, Background, p. 686 
31 Gwassa, Outbreak, p. 277  
32 Even their names are spelled in many different ways. I follow the spellings commonly employed in 
Tanzanian Maji Maji historiography of Gwassa-Iliffe tradition.  
33 Iliffe, Modern history, pp. 171, 196, 198; Nuhn, Flammen, p. 153; Bell, pp. 52 (quotation) 
34 For Mamba, Götzen, Aufstand, p. 231, Abdul Karim Jamaliddini, Utenzi wa vita vya Maji Maji; 
Becker, Traders, pp. 5-6. His role has also been contested, eg. by Gwassa, Outbreak.  
35 Iliffe, Modern History, pp. 174-75, 195; Nuhn, Flammen, pp. 91, 93, 155. Nuhn uses the German 
way of spelling, Mburu. 
36 For the war in Unongi, O.P. Mapunda and G.P.Mpangara, The Maji Maji War in Ungoni. Nairobi, 
1968. See also Patrick Redmond, ‘Maji Maji in Ungoni: a reappraisal of existing historiography’, 
International Journal of African Historical Studies  8 (1975), pp. 407-24   
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If the accounts are so garbled and fragmented, could it be that it is not only because 
our sources are so defective but because of our image of a unified Maji Maji was in 
fact not the case? What if it indeed was a collection of very loosely if at all 
interconnected local uprisings and struggles, each arising from local grievances and 
political constellations, just as the emerging postcolonial, or postmodernist 
interpretation claims? After all, Maji Maji did not have much military organization 
worth the name. There was no military plan, no general command, no common 
agenda. There is no sign of military co-ordination or other synchronization of the 
rebel tactics. Most peoples had their rebels and loyalists and the borderline was 
sometimes blurred: many individuals were divided among themselves. Kinjala, who 
had been a tax collector of the Ngoni in Ngindoland and then a German jumbe, had 
originally opposed the rebellion but had been forced to carry maji to Ungoni to save 
his life. The Kitchi rebel leader Mkechekeche may have been the same jumbe 
‘Kechekeche’ who is reported to have sat in the ex tempore German military court in 
Mohoro, which condemned Bokero and Kinjikitile to death.37 Chief Merere of 
Usangu first accepted maji but had to relinquish it under pressure from his senior 
relatives and ended up providing auxiliaries to the Germans. The Makua chief Hatia 
provided men for Selemani Mamba’s troops but other Makuas, probabably fearing 
Mwera expansionism, declined to participate. The Yao ruler Mataka turned down 
Chabruma’s bid for alliance. The warlike Hehe, despite some temptation, no longer 
moved against the Germans. In addition to Merere, Kiwanga of Ubena provided 
auxiliary troops to them. As a rule the military encounters were local, which was why 
the rebels were so easy to overcome. Their early success proved deceptive; it had to 
do more with colonial ignorance and exclusion than rebel strength. 
 
It is also important to recognize the geographical limits to the rebellion. Far from the 
‘whole of the South’ was involved. Sustained military activity was concentrated in 
relatively few areas. The heartlands were the Matumbi Hills and their surroundings up 
to the coast, the militarily and commercially important areas around Liwale and 
Madaba inhabited by the Ngindo and Pogoro, some spots along the Lukuledi valley 
from Nyangao to the vicinity of Lindi, and much of Mshope and Upangwa in the 
South-West. The rest of the rebel areas were involved more sporadically, by way of a 
few isolated battles, even if some of them were big. Large areas remained almost 
untouched. The battles did not really spread into the densely inhabited areas south of 
the Lukuledi river expect for some initial disturbances among a few northern 
Makonde headmen and Mwera-Makua raids on the Yao stronghold of Luagala.38 The 
coastal areas under closer colonial control also escaped, especially the Lindi 
plantations. 
 
In this view, it was not one big bang but a series of independent outbreaks stemming 
from myriad different grievances and leading to a long series of loosely if at all 
interconnected independent struggles, each feeding on a contingent precedent. In 
postcolonial research, many suggestions, echoing a postmodernist belief in the death 
of great narratives, have been made. In Uzaramo, Sunseri wants us to believe, it was 
more about changing gender relations than colonial exploitation. Local headmen tried 
to regain some of the power and patronage they had lost to the womenfolk during 
                                                          
37 Stollowsky, Background, p.  691   
38 For the role of the Makonde in Maji Maji, see Götzen, Aufstand, p. 164; and Becker, Traders, p. 15. 
Cf. Iliffe, Modern History, p. 194.  
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early colonialism.39 Becker thinks Maji Maji represented a continuation of power 
game among local ‘big men’. Proactively, ‘fighters tried to seize a promising moment 
so as to secure or extend the benefits they had reaped or hoped to reap from the 
ongoing changes in commercial, political and military relations’.40 In Njombe, 
Mpangire, the ‘firebrand’ (Iliffe) son of Mbeyela, was said to have been more 
interested in seizing the wife of the missionary Gröschel of Yakobi than building up 
anticolonial political alliances. Giblin even doubts whether maji ever reached 
Ubena.41 In Songea, nkosi Chabruma was very doubtful when Kinjala, a Ngindo, 
formerly tributary to the Ngoni, arrived with maji. Chabruma consulted his diviners 
and tested maji on a dog and a prisoner. Both died when shot. ‘Let us drink the maji 
maji medicine so that we may all perish’, he is reported to have declared.42 Yet he 
accepted it and made his subjects do the same; his reasons apparently were at another 
level.  
 
Intriguingly, the oral-based accounts of the very outbreak of the whole affair at 
Nandete can be read in a postnationalist vein. In the dominant version we have a 
group of local men, tired of being exploited in the local communal field, going and 
uprooting a few shoots of cotton as a symbolic act of defiance. In most original 
accounts, it is otherwise although there is no agreement as to how it was. The earliest 
oral testimonies, as collected by Father Ambrious Meyer at Kipatimu, depicted it as a 
spat between Akida Seif and Jumbe Mtemangani of Nandete, which escalated out of 
control. Seif apparently was a universally hated man but Mtemangani is also 
remembered as impatient and arrogant and emerges here as the original instigator. 
The two came into conflict, for reasons which are not clear, and Mtemangani decided 
to attack. He destroyed the official cottonfield of the akida and that of Kulita (who 
belonged to the same akidat), forcing Kulita to join.43 Captain Merker also mentions 
that the origin of the fighting was ‘a private quarrel between two Matumbi jumbes’.44 
In later accounts, commoners began the rebellion and Mtemangani joined in later or 
not at all.45 According to another version, two Matumbi men got fed up with whip of 
the akidas on the cotton field and beat them up. Waiting for the inevitable colonial 
retaliation to come, they uprooted the cotton and started to prepare for war.46 Another, 
slightly different account connects grievances of cotton and whipping at Nandete with 
                                                          
39 Sunseri, Famine and wild pigs. How the restoration was supposed to take place is hard to fathom 
from Sunseri’s argument. More recently, he has suggested that the outbreak was a a popular  reaction to 
establishment of forest reserves: Wiedling the Ax, ... 
40 Becker, Traders, p. 17 
41 James Giblin, ‘The War of Korosani” and Oral History at Jacobi, Njombe’, forthcoming in Giblin 
and Monson, eds. (fn. 4 above). Cf. Seth I. Nyagava, A History of the Bena, Iringa University College, 
1999, p 133, who says that the attack was ‘not connected’ with the arrival of maji.. 
42 G.P. Mpangara, ’Songea Bbano’, seminar paper, University College Dar es Salaam, as quoted in 
Iliffe, Modern History, p. 187  
43 ‚Wie 1905 im Matumbi…’, Father Ambrosius spells the name as ’Temangani’. 
44 As quoted by Götzen, Aufstand, p. 46 
45 The names of the commoners in question differ slightly in different versions. In the Gwassa-Iliffe 
account they are Ngulumbalyo Mandai and Lindimyo Machela. The same names are mentioned, with 
varying spellings, in the accounts referred to below. In Nandete in 2004, a third name was added:  
Ndumbalio Machela, Mitazamo mipya, p. 119. 
46 This is from a handwritten account by Mzee Michael Mwiru from Kipatimu:‘Historia ya vita ya Maji 
Maji (Mapokeo)’, collected in 1983 by Hubert Gundolf und partly published in German translation in 
his Maji Maji – Blut für Afrika. St.Ottilien, 1984,  pp. 137-40. It is based on the oral testimony of Mzee 
Ali Hemedi Lipunjo Mangdangwa from Kibata. The exact identities of him, the man interviewed by 
Gwassa, fn. 15 above, and the one interviewed later by ourselves in 2004; see the footnote immediately 
below, remain speculative.  
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the Germans sending an expedition to arrest Kinjikitile. ‘Two Germans came from 
Mohoro and Samanga and went to Nandete. Ngurimbalo Mandai said “Let us fight 
them”…. When the Germans brought askari to Ngarambe [to arrest] Kinjikitile 
medicine was prepared and there was an order from Ngarambe, let us fight the white 
man.’47  
 
In all accounts, fighting ensued, a few people died, and the akida fled. But the point 
shared by all Matumbi versions is that originally this was very much a Matumbi affair 
which might have taken place in any case and would not on its own have led to wider 
consequences. Father Ambrosius argues that if there had been no agitation, or further 
instigation from Ngarambe, the Matumbi disturbances would have died down and the 
people would have happily returned home. Basically the same view is alive and well 
in Nandete today – had Kinjikitile not come around with his fake magic water, events 
would have taken a different turn. The Matumbi-German war continues to be 
understood as separate from Maji Maji.48  
 
Maji Maji as chain of connected struggles 
 
Whatever the explanatory power of these particularistic circumstances and revisionist 
views, and it must vary from case to case, I think it is obvious that they are in danger 
of not seeing the forest for the trees. They are based on highly localized memory. 
They overlook or downplay the multitude of wider connections and unifying factors 
and frameworks that in each case were there and ignore many of the patterns that 
emerged once the train of events was set in motion. I would argue for the need of 
combining the insights from unified and localized interpretations and thinking in 
terms of an overall chain of several, loosely connected waves of regional struggles, 
brought together mainly by the maji. How the nets and nodes in these zones should be 
seen is another question: I would tentatively suggest thinking in terms of two zones, 
primary and secondary, both with cores and peripheries of their own. The primary 
zone was located in the Liwale-Lukuledi-Mahenge area, with more peripheral sub-
zones in Uzaramo, the Kilombero valley, and Uvidunda-Kilosa; and the secondary 
zone is in Ungoni-Upangwa-Njombe. They were bound together by the maji, often 
mediated by people with a Ngindo or, possibly, Pogoro connection.  
  
In this framework, a major difference is caused by the historical relationship of the 
peoples concerned with the pre-existing water cults. That the fighting first broke out 
in Nandete, which is in Matumbiland, has obscured the essential role of the Ngindo, 
or Donde,49 something which has now been ably rescued by Lorne Larson.50 The 
Pogoro living in the Liwale district seemed to have been early and deeply involved 
                                                          
47 Mzee Ali Hemed Lipunjo, Kibata, 18 July 2004, Mitazamo mipya, pp. 57-58. He was born in 1928 
and told us that he had learned all this from his father, a police askari in the German service.  
48 Focus group discussion with wazee of Nandete, 17 July 2004, Mitazamo mipya, pp.105 ff. 
49 The Germans often referred to Wadonde but these have disappeared from the ethnographic map of 
Tanzania, being conflated with Wangindo. However, there are still people called and calling 
themselves Wadonde, living in the Liwale highlands as distinct from Ngindo lowlanders. I follow the 
modern custom of generally conflating the two.          
50 In his contribution to the forthcoming Giblin-Monson volume, see fn. 4 above. I am grateful to Dr 
Larson for making it available to me in mimeo.  
 13 
but their role remains much less investigated and understood.51 After Kibata, the next 
rebel targets were Kingwhochiro, 14 miles from Liwale-Kilwa road; Liwale, a 
German police post some 200 km south-west of Matumbiland; and Madaba, a trading 
centre more than 100 km east of Nandete in what is now Selous. These attacks were 
independent of those in the Matumbi Hills. With the communications of those days – 
and of today as well – these are geographically faraway places, at several days’ 
walking distance from each other. It is reported that the leader of the attack in 
Kingwhochiro and Liwale, Abdallah Mapanda, had been to Ngarambe and received 
maji from Kinjikitile whereas Madaba, as noted above, was an independent 
distribution centre for maji in its own right and the medicine man Ngameya 
participated in the military action himself. Also, the Mwera people had been in touch 
with the northern water cults. The leaders who took the war to the South in late 
August, Selemani Mamba and his nephew Said Toroka, had gone to Ngarambe, and a 
sizeable amount of Ngindo and Donde, warriors participated in their troops.  
 
While all the above war leaders had had a close personal connection with the northern 
shrines and medicine men, maji reached Uzaramo and Kilombero valley through 
emissaries called hongo and was taken further by other emissaries from there to 
Usagara and Uvidunda. In Uzaramo, the Kolelo cult had been active but personal 
contacts with Rufiji had not been that close. The movement was largely confined to 
the Southern part with jumbe Digalu Kibasila of Kisangire at its head. Some of 
Kibasila’s kinspeople are told to have gone to Rufiji for ‘Koleo magic’, but Kibasila 
himself denied a direct connection with maji. He is said to have converted to the cause 
because of its promise to bring the ancestors back.52 Elsewhere, maji crossed the 
limits of pre-existing water cults carried by hongos.  
 
Very little is known about the hongo. In some accounts, ‘Hongo’ figures as a proper 
name of one of the original Matumbi mediums while elsewhere it apparently came to 
denote anyone carrying maji from one place to another.53 In the Kilombero valley the 
main actors, in addition to the Pogoro, were the Mbunga, culturally related to the 
Ngindo but with a hierarchical political and military organisation. They attacked the 
Ifakara boma and carried maji further. They also attached the Mahenge boma two 
days after the original attempt. The Germans exhausted their resources in the defense 
of the boma and were unable to prevent Mbunga hongos going up to Kilosa and 
Uvidunda and recruiting allies there. Chitalika seized the moment and organized an 
attack at Kilosa with troops of more than 3,000 men consisting of Sagara and 
Mbunga. 
 
The secondary zone was in the South West - Ungoni, Upangwa and Njombe, again 
with considerable internal differentiation. Its relations with the original water cult 
were practically non-existent. While there were some shared beliefs, the Rufiji water 
shrines carried no particular meaning here. These societies and cultures were also 
very different from those in the first, primary zone. The Ngoni, descendants of the 
Zulu people in South Africa, were dreaded as conquerors. They had migrated into the 
                                                          
51 The active role of the Liwale Pogoro is emphasised by Bell but there has not been much subsequent 
research on this. The later understanding is that the Pogoro living elsewhere often refused maji, see e.g. 
Kazimoto, MMRP, 8/68/1/1; and Iliffe, Modern History, p. 177. 
52 ‘Kibassira und die Unruhen im Bezirk DSM’, Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Zeitung (DOAZ), 22 Sept 
1906; Klamroth, Beiträge pp. 140-141, also extract in Gwassa and Iliffe (ed.) Records, pp. 16-17. 
53 Kalembo, MMRP, 7/68/1/1, pp. 3-4. 7-8 
 14 
area in the late 19th century, imposed themselves upon the original inhabitants and 
established two centralised kingdoms, Mshope and Njelu. After this they had 
continued pillaging their neighbours, not least the different Ngindo-related groups 
such as the Ndendeuli and submitted many of these to a tributary relationship.  
 
But they had not properly resisted the German conquest and maji gave their leaders 
the opportunity to do so in the context of a wider anti-colonial uprising. It is possible 
to see an ethnic connection here: Kinjala, a Mngindo, approached the Ngoni through a 
part of Mshope inhabited by Ndendeuli, a Ngindo-related people. But the decision to 
fight was that of the Ngoni aristocracy. After Chabruma had decided to take maji, he 
actively encouraged its spread by dispatching hongos to Njelu and Upangwa. How, or 
even whether, maji reached Ubena is contested. The traditional understanding is that it 
came from Ungoni but there were also reports that it spread through Mbunga 
emissaries. In any case, there apparently were enough local grievances, from heavy 
taxation to missionary meddling with existing cultural and political relations to induce 
old Mbeyela and his sons to join the spreading rebellion.54 
 
From this perspective, Maji Maji was a network of anti-colonial military actions of 
various kinds where maji functioned as the medium of communication and symbol of 
alliance. Colonialism should be understood widely enough and the role of maji seen 
differentially in various contexts. Anti-colonial feelings ran high. Although German 
rule was thin on the ground in terms of German agents, the indirect colonial presence 
was pervasive and the attacks were directed against almost all who were understood 
as colonial collaborators. Maji created a bond between very different actions and, 
above all, distinguished ‘insiders’ from ‘outsiders’.  
 
Seen as such, Maji Maji appears as a ‘hinterland’ movement, excluding coastal 
peoples. Activities taking place on the coast were carried out by warriors from inland. 
Not only did the coastal people refuse to join but they carefully distanced themselves 
from the shensi of the interior.55 Yet this does not mean that all the rebels would have 
been uncouth backwoods people. Both Christianity and Islam had started making 
inroads into the rebel areas and it is clear from the names of the rebel leaders alone 
that there were Muslims and apparently also Christian converts among them. Maji 
itself, I will suggest below, had more global ambitions. 
 
The view advocated here does not presuppose an evil conspiracy or grand plan but 
rather sees Maji Maji as a ‘chain rebellion’ where one event sparked another. Timing 
is of utmost importance. In the established, unified struggle narrative the action in the 
cotton field in Nandete starts late in July 1905, perhaps around the 25th. But we know 
that trouble had been brewing before this. Germans had got the earliest warning on 
the 13th when the akida of Kibata sent a letter to Kilwa complaining that a medicine 
man was ‘encouraging insubordination’ among the people. At the same time the 
Mohoro district office had been temporarily taken over by the overzealous 
Stollowsky, who was determined to put an end to the ‘nonsense’ of the group of 
magicians swindling people of their money and sent police askaris to both Ngarambe 
and Kibambwe to arrest Kinjikitile and Bokero. The arrests were ordered on the 12th 
                                                          
54 Nyagava, Bena, pp. 129 ff. 
55 Most notably, Abdul Karim Jamaliddini, Utenzi wa vita vya Maji Maji. 
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and 16th of July; Kinjikitile was brought to Mohoro on the 16th, Bokero a few days 
later.56  
 
If these events are connected with the disturbances at Nandete, as in one oral account 
above, it can be suggested that the latter may have taken place earlier in July. In that 
case there was a longer interval between these and the Matumbi attack on Kibata on 
the 28th. After the Matumbi returned home, the Ngindo and Porogo, with Abdullah 
Mapanda at the helm, took over the maji and carried on fighting; Selimani Mamba 
and the other southerners climbed on the bandwagon; and Kinjala persuaded 
Chabruma to join in. In this scenario, the Germans were completely in the dark, not 
for a few days but for weeks. After the first open attacks they thought they were 
dealing with ‘local disturbances’. Confusion reigned in colonial headquarters. 
Governor Götzen says he realised himself only on the 15th of August, that is when 
Mahenge was attacked, that he had a full scale rebellion at hand.57 Could it be that this 
was one of those seminal historical interregnums during which the world for a while 
loses its predictable coordinates and things turn upside down?58 Was it perhaps only 
during this political and spiritual interregnum that what had started as local struggles 
turned into a full-scale rebellion?  
 
Discussion on causes: one big cause or many small ones? 
 
While such a view does not presuppose prior planning it assumes the presence of a 
number of underlying structural conditions which hatched the processes, contributed 
to trigger them and enabled them to run their course. If there are so many question 
marks concerning what actually happened and how, how can we ever imagine 
obtaining a satisfactory view of the possibly common underlying factors and 
mechanisms? Whatever Maji Maji was, it was something unprecedented, as puzzling 
to the colonialists as to later historians. Why did tens if not hundreds of thousands of 
combatants belonging to at least twenty or more different African peoples decide to 
rise against the colonial power so forcefully?  How was it possible for them to do it so 
simultaneously over such a wide area? If Maji Maji was an anti-colonial uprising, 
why was it confined to the South? Why did it not spread to the North which was much 
more heavily under colonial assault?  
 
Maji Maji as an anticolonial and anti-cotton movement 
 
The causes of the rebellion have been debated since it broke out. The debate is 
patently unfinished. What is common to most interpretations is that they see Maji 
Maji as a movement against rather than for something. But against what? One 
obvious suggestion put immediately forward was that it was a general anti-colonial 
uprising against the manifest oppression and brutality which were built-in features of 
German colonial policy.59 The hut tax, forced labour, compulsory cultivation, petty 
despotism by the akida and askari, heavy and intense flogging, conservation of forests 
and wild animals at the expense of African interests, forced attendance of Islamic 
children at missionary schools in some places - all these were mentioned in an official 
report by Götzen as factors which had aroused the dissatisfaction of Africans. By 
                                                          
56 Götzen, Aufstand, p. 62; Stollowsky, Background, pp. 685 ff., 694. 
57 Bald, Afrikanischer Kampf, pp. 31-32. 
58 This idea is inspired by Jonathon Glassman, Feasts and Riot. Heinemann, Portsmouth, 1995.  
59 The following draws on my earlier work, Koponen, Development for Exploitation, pp. 234 ff.  
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reading this report aloud to the Reichstag in Berlin, the great socialist orator Bebel 
considered he had proved that German colonial policy was an 'exploitation policy' and 
that the rebellion gave no reason for surprise. The missionaries who were most 
affected - mainly the German Benedictines and Berlin I, and more peripherally also 
UMCA and the Spiritans - repeated much the same list, emphatically denying their 
own culpability through forced schooling or otherwise, and emphasizing the brutality 
of non-African akida and deceitful practices of Indian traders.  
 
As was quickly pointed out, whatever the general accuracy of these claims, they had 
one obvious weak point. The rebellion did not break out in the north-eastern areas of 
the colony, which were most heavily under the colonial yoke, but in the south, to 
which the colonial administration and colonial economy extended far less directly and 
which had been considered thoroughly ‘pacified’. In the south, too, while the small 
European farms in Kilwa were attacked, the larger plantations in Lindi avoided the 
rebellion. Accordingly, most officials and pro-colonial politicians were inclined to 
seek causes of the rebellion in restricted local mistakes and 'excesses' rather than in 
any general structural features of colonialism. Basically any of the grievances 
mentioned in Götzen’s list would do, but in subsequent discourse, one has been raised 
above the rest: forced cultivation of cotton. It was blamed by the colonialists, and 
taken over by the nationalist historians. In the popular imagination, in tourist 
guidebooks, newspaper articles, and even in some research, in Tanzania and 
elsewhere, Maji Maji continues to be seen as a great anti-cotton uprising.  
 
In dealing with this discussion we need to recognize that the views on the nature of 
the movement and its causes are closely intertwined, and in the social life the variety 
of factors that carry causal power operate differently in different contexts. Any debate 
on the causes of historical and social events and processes becomes confused if it fails 
to differentiate between the various causal factors and influences. At the very 
minimum, we have should categorize the ’causes’ into those that are more basic and 
those that are more contingent. On the one hand, we can speak of ultimate causes or 
structural factors, and on the other hand of proximate causes, or enabling and 
triggering factors. Any major historical event or process can then be seen to originate 
from a combination of these various factors.  
 
In this framework the cotton explanation begins to look very narrow. At best it can be 
taken as a contingent, triggering factor. That was how it was originally perceived – it 
was elevated to the category of a more general cause only later. It was not the 
cultivation of cotton that was seen the problem but a very particular form of it, 
compulsory cotton growing in village fields and what were called 'jumbe shambas'. 
This was practised in many areas where the rebellion broke out and was widely 
resented. All contemporary investigators of the origin of the outbreak, while differing 
on many other matters, mentioned it among the main grievances, albeit with differing 
emphases. In his analysis of the causes of the rebellion, the next Governor, Albrecht 
Freiherr von Rechenberg, found the communal field system largely responsible for the 
outbreak, and Iliffe, the most influential historian of Maji Maji, endowed this claim 
with the status of a historical explanation. In oral research conducted by Gwassa, the 
starting shot of the whole rebellion took place as an act of defiance in the communal 
field in Nandete.  
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Yet forced cotton cultivation must be put into a larger colonial context. It seems 
reasonable to regard the village shambas, despite their importance, as one cause of 
discontent among many. They were only operated in some parts of the coastal 
districts, not in other districts of the interior, and their forms varied from district to 
district. Their prominence in the contemporary discussion is partly explained by the 
fact that they provided a suitable scapegoat, to be done away with by the pretext of 
rebellion. Dissatisfaction with the system was by no means confined to the African 
people. European colonists and colonist-minded officials also bitterly resented this 
'communist way of cultivation'. A labour shortage was looming and village shambas 
had heightened competition for labour. The conspicuous command economy run by 
akidas withdrew people from the labour reserve of European employers and missions 
and left them less time for individual cash crop production. Colonists and their 
mouthpieces launched several attacks against village shambas much before the 
rebellion. After its outbreak it was easy for the anti-village shamba lobby among the 
Germans to force their abolition. Today, there is no reason to cling to the colonialist 
line of argumentation that they were the cause of Maji Maji.  
 
Structural framework of Maji Maji 
 
But even if we would be ready to abandon the search for one overarching cause we do 
not have to give up the issue of causality altogether or adopt the view of later 
postcolonial historians of Maji Maji, who regard it as a series of localized battles with 
locally varying causes, only indirectly if at all connected with colonial rule. It is 
certainly warranted and long overdue to give serious consideration to basically 
internal factors in the societies involved, such as age and gender differences, 
exacerbated by aspects of colonial rule. Yet, considering the extent and timing of the 
disturbances, it still must be warranted to search for some underlying patterns. And I 
think such patterns must be sought in the colonial system as well as and in changes in 
the African societies that were involved. 
 
I have previously suggested that colonial tax and trade statistics might give as a 
clue.60 I still think this line of argumentation is valid; and some more recent research 
lends new corroboration to it. The value of such statistics is that they give us some 
indication as to what was happening in the areas that joined the rebellion. Obviously 
they were not under direct colonial control as closely as the urban or estate areas in 
the northeast, but they were by no means aloof from the colonial political economy. 
Indicators are admittedly approximate and open to interpretation, but they point in the 
same direction. Tax statistics reveal that the tax load was at least as heavy or even 
heavier in districts which joined the rebellion – that is, Lindi, Kilwa, Rufiji, Dar es 
Salaam, Mahenge, Songea, partly Morogoro - than in the European farming districts 
and it was increasing, while taxation in other parts of the country was appreciably 
lighter. Trade statistics show that the value of exports from southern harbours 
continuously exceeded that of imports. Yet this is not say that those areas would have 
been ‘clearly prospering’61; rather they must be seen as heavily exploited. More 
                                                          
60 For details and sources, ibid, pp. 237-39.  
61 As famously suggested by Iliffe, Modern Tanganyika, p. 130.  
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resources were taken out than were brought in and the coastal trade was stagnating or 
declining in the early years of the 20th century.62 
 
If we combine what has been said above about trade, the geographical spread of the 
rebellion and the movements of maji it is easy to see that the areas of the primary 
outbreak of Maji Maji broadly coincided with those of intensive trade carried from 
precolonial times onwards and it spread through trading routes, both along the main 
long-distance routes going south-west from Kilwa through Ngindoland to Songea. and 
along the route in Lukuledi valley from Lindi to Masasi.as well as the smaller north-
south routes criss-crossing these. But it was not simply a question of precolonial 
traders resisting colonial intruders. The trade itself was being transformed and had 
acquired new dynamics. Instead of ivory and slaves, much of it, especially in Ngindo 
and Mwera areas, was based on collection of landophia rubber. In stark contrast to 
earlier high-value trade goods, rubber collection was open to anyone with access to a 
knife. By the early years of the 20th century it had attracted thousands of small 
entrepreneurs.63 Much of this had degenerated into reckless exploitation of 
exhaustible resources, with differential and seasonally fluctuating rewards. The rubber 
trade was conducted by giving advances to the collectors, and good years were 
inevitably followed by bad. One of the main grievances going beyond colonial 
harassment recorded among the people was the heavy indebtedness many rubber 
collectors and petty traders had incurred in this game.  
 
At the same time, the colonial apparatus was by no means absent. The Germans were 
pushing on with their intervention, albeit mainly through middlemen of various types. 
On the coastal hinterland, in much of what was been called above the primary zone of 
Maji Maji, the colonial intervention took the form of a profusion of taxes, decrees and 
regulations. As Regierunsrat Haber recorded from his inspection tour to Kilwa and 
Lindi, he heard complaints ‘over and over again ... that the Serkal (government) never 
tired of regulations and orders, hastened to proclaim new taxes, new imposts, new 
labours; the akidas and jumbes did not know what to arrange first, the natives were 
hounded, punished, embittered.’ In addition to coerced cultivation and other forced 
labour, among the unpopular measures frequently mentioned were restrictions on 
hunting, especially the prohibition of hunting by nets. Also, factors such as 
resettlement of people along the roads, or the compulsory schooling of children were 
occasionally noted. The jumbes, as close representatives of their own people on whom 
the colonialists placed increasingly onerous demands, felt between a rock and a hard 
place. Many were attracted to join the rebellion.  
 
Further in the interior, in the secondary zone, more discontent was obviously 
generated by taxation, the tangible marker of the intruding colonial state imposing 
itself. In particular, the money tax and the often brutal methods of its collection raised 
resistance. Money was much rarer in the interior than nearer the coast. When tax 
payment was demanded in cash, it forced the people to intensify the collection of 
rubber or copal or to engage in wage work as porters or estate labourers, or 
alternatively, to settle tax obligations labouring for the local boma. Not only were 
                                                          
62 See Patrick Krajewski’s research, summed up in ‘Dampfer und Dhaus. Küstenhandel und 
Landwirtschaft vor dem Krieg’, Felicitas Becker and Jigal Beez (eds), Der Maji-Maji Krieg in 
Deutsch-Ostafrika 1905-1907, Berlin, 2005, pp. 49-58. 
63 Marcia Wright, ‘Towards an Appraisal of the Place of Rubber in Tanzania History: the German 
Period’, Paper for the Historical Association of Tanzania Conference, 1976; Becker, Traders, pp. 9-11.  
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rebellious districts among the most heavily taxed, but also within districts the more 
heavily taxed areas tended to join the rebellion more easily. There were considerable 
internal differences, of course. Whereas the Ngindo and Pogoro were heavily 
involved and indebted in the rubber trade and deeply in debt – as personified by 
Abdallah Mapanda, who was indebted to the German trader his men killed in Liwale - 
for the Mbunga more resentment probably stemmed from German interference in 
their traditional warfare. The common underlying factor was that areas which 
participated in Maji Maji paid a substantial amount of tax in 1905 while areas that 
remained outside paid little or nothing. The sub-district Liwale, where the rebellion 
began, was among the most heavily taxed areas of the colony. Also, African oral 
sources make it clear that discontent with the money tax was strong and widespread. 
 
Thus it can be argued that Maji Maji took place in areas in which the colonial 
economy was in the grips of an extractive mode and which at the same time were 
being incorporated more closely into the colonial political economy. The earliest 
German colonial policy was, I have argued elsewhere, not only exploitative but 
extremely extractive.64 It can be best seen as a drive to carve a colonial economy on 
the booming mercantile extraction of resources, with only a few hesitant attempts at 
developing a productive economy. It was not by coincidence that the Germans had 
entered an area where a brisk pre-colonial trade was taking place. What they first had 
in mind was to impose themselves as masters on the indigenous trading system and 
exploit it by taking their share of it. But local resistance, especially that along the 
coast, made this preferred policy of ’exploitation without development’ unworkable in 
most places even prior to Maji Maji. One of the few areas where it seemed to have 
any prospects was in the southern rubber collection areas. The direct presence of the 
colonial coercive apparatus was weak here and a more forceful colonial intervention 
was called for. Such a situation, it can be suggested, in many ways created 
preconditions conducive to a rebellion. Falling rubber prices and accumulating debt 
gave ample reason for discontent in some areas, while rising taxes and heavy-handed 
collection methods did so in others. Pre-existing trade routes, complemented by new 
colonial roads built by forced labour, supplied the necessary means of communication 
by which the maji message was able to travel.   
 
Maji Maji as a socio-religious movement: God of Black People 
 
People may be seen to work in and through social structures but how they themselves 
think about what drives them on is rather different. To appreciate the workings of 
their agency we should understand their own categories of thought. This takes us back 
to the intricacies of maji but also beyond them. As should be evident from what has 
been said above, the traditional understanding of maji as a ready-made anti-European 
war medicine, uniform across the rebel area, must now be taken as suspicious at best. 
Many details may be irretrievably lost but I suggest that if we read the available 
evidence in the light of the interpretation suggested above it is warranted to emphasise 
the forward-looking elements in maji and its affinities with other ‘socio-religious 
movements’ elsewhere. While the German interpretation saw Maji Maji as an 
atavistic drive to return to the past, and the nationalist interpretation made it a 
modernist harbinger of national liberation, both missed the possibility that its real 
innovations lay on the spiritual side. Maji Maji of course was not a religious war in 
                                                          
64 Koponen, Development for Exploitation, pp.177 ff. 
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the sense of pitting adherents of one religion against another but I do not think much 
sense can be made of it without taking its religious dimensions seriously.  
 
The question of what constitutes a religion is a moot one but should not deter us here. 
Few scholars would doubt that in the world view of African people, living in the 
period of transition from pre-colonial to colonial rule, the physically immanent world 
and invisible spiritual forces were inextricably intertwined. As Rhonda Gonzales has 
most recently suggested, among the Bantu people it was taken for granted that in 
creating social institutions, spirits mattered because they played a part in accessing 
power. Spirits, both of ancestors and of different natural places or phenomena, 
influenced the sphere of the physical as well as the reverse.65 That this was the case 
with Maji Maji is amply evident from what has been said above; in fact; it has been 
evident for long. Yet the religious dimension of the rebellion has been oddly narrowed 
down to the belief in maji and the ‘indigenous religions’ it implied. This may be more 
understandable for the colonialists, who were not inclined to recognize the African 
belief systems as ‘religion’ at all, but also later historians, in their eagerness to 
emphasize the ideological and rational side of the rebellion have evaded the religious 
undertones that went beyond the maji magic. Tackling Maji Maji in religious terms 
still raises quite a few eyebrows. But I wish to suggest that we take the evidence 
seriously and view it in the light of Gonzales’ argument that in looking at the early 
history of Bantu peoples, religion should not be taken as ‘incidental to any institution 
… but rather as a dominant prism’. It then makes sense that Maji Maji is seen as 
unfolding together with a major religious innovation: the emergence of an 
interventionist God, capable of interfering in the lives of people.  
 
The evidence for this is scanty, fragmentary and indirect, but there is some. The best 
of it comes from among the Zaramo where Martin Klamroth, a perceptive German 
missionary, reported that the Kolelo cult was undergoing an internal transformation in 
early 1905. Not only was its message turning more political, but in addition to the big 
snake-spirit Kolelo, or Bokero, a high God was said to have appeared. This was 
presented as the ‘God of the Black People’. Klamroth recounts local accounts that in 
1905 Kolelo concerned himself with politics. He forbade the further payment of taxes 
to the white foreigners and prophesised that a great flood would come and destroy all 
the whites and their followers, or the earth would open and swallow them. ‘Later it 
was said that … no bullets but only water would come from the soldiers guns…. ‘Be 
not afraid, Kolelo spares his black children.’ Soon, however, it was no longer Kolelo 
but ‘God himself who cared for his children… Kolelo has not adequately fulfilled his 
task, so that God himself appeared.’ Only God had the unlimited power over life and 
death and could resurrect the ancestors.66  
 
There are remarkable similarities here with what anecdotal evidence we have from the 
rebel areas. All the main mediums of the spirit Bokero similarly declared that a new 
God had arisen and claimed the power to bring the ancestors back. Bokero at 
Kimbabwe preached that a great flood would come. Only the mountain summits 
would stand above the water and on these the black people would find a safe refuge 
while all the foreigners would perish. Kinjikitile told his German interrogators that he 
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was just a ‘poor man before God’ and the money people had given to him for maji 
had been taken by God. Bokero famously declared from the scaffolding in Mohoro 
that he was not afraid to die: he had been sent by God, and all the black people would 
stand together as his medicine had already reached Kilosa and Mahenge. Kinjala, 
cutting an image of a prophet in his white kanzu, was variously referred to as a son or 
brother of God while the captured rebel soldiers said they were askari ya Mungu, 
God’s soldiers.67  
 
A caveat is in place. The concept of ‘God’ has been, of course, subject to long and 
erudite discussion and it is far from clear to what kind of God these mostly garbled 
colonial or missionary accounts refer to. But this must not lead us to overlook that 
something very important was happening in this respect. There is not much doubt that 
all the people who were involved in the rebellion recognized a Creator, a singular 
force that had been there since the beginning of time, or Mulungu in Kizaramo and 
other nearby languages (with Mungu as a Swahilized version, which was later 
appropriated to mean the Christian, omnipotent God). Originally, however, Mulungu 
was not known to show any interest in later intervening in what he had once initiated 
nor had the people any means to communicate with him; they were dealing with the 
spirits.68 Against this, the new ‘God of the Black People’, with the powers of sending 
prophets, taking in money, to bring ancestors back to life, and actively caring for his 
flock, cuts a revolutionary figure and represents a major shift in the systems of belief. 
That it may be impossible for the moment to understand how such an idea emerged - 
it would be a subject to a new research project – does not obliterate its historical 
significance.   
 
In this configuration, origins of maji as war medicine can be better appreciated. In 
spite of the similarity in beliefs, the Zaramo did not have maji of their own and the 
most of them did not join the rebellion. I believe this indicates that maji was 
transformed into a war medicine against the Europeans and a medium of African 
military alliance in the encounter between the new religious ideas and the Rufiji 
shrines; and I suspect this happened at a rather late date. There does not seem to be 
much reason to doubt that originally the Rufiji medicine was a wide-spectre panacea, 
which, in Merker’s description, was meant to free people from agricultural worries, 
guarantee a good harvest, confer prosperity and health, protect from famine and 
sickness, and especially to protect the fields against the devastation of the wild pigs, 
which had become a plague as they recovered rapidly from devastating panzootics at 
the same time as the colonial hunting restrictions made it more difficult to contain 
them. Maji apparently had the potential of protection against a human enemy as well 
but it can be suggested that it attained its militant anti-foreigner content only 
gradually, and this probably was connected with the advent of the God of the Black 
People. ‘Black’ here obviously refers as much to the colour of skin as to the socio-
political position. The way German rule was organized in these areas caused all 
indigenous people, from jumbes to commoners, suffer from it and all people who 
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were subjected to exigencies and tribulations of colonialism were seen as black. Maji 
may not have had its specific function as an anti-European war medicine, with its 
strict taboos on things like sexual intercourse, until the very eve of the outbreak of 
fighting. This is speculation, of course, but it is corroborated by some pieces of 
evidence. According to some accounts the military training and the order to ‘destroy 
the read earth [the European]’ was not given in Matumbi until during the interregnum, 
when the decision to fight the Germans had been made. Not a few Ngindo believed 
that the one who gave maji its military twist was Abdullah Mapanda.69 
 
Whereas Maji Maji was unique in Tanzanian history, it can be understood as one 
among ‘socio-religious movements’ which tend to emerge in similar circumstances in 
which formerly independent local societies are subjugated to foreign rule and opened 
to rapid social and economic changes.70 These are social and political movements 
based on concerted and common action, rooted in genuine social and political 
grievances; but their ideologies tend to be spiritual and religious in the sense that they 
draw on otherwordly forces, which may not be seen but whose efficacy is not 
doubted. Such movements commonly contain both forward-looking and backward-
looking elements and as much as they spring from their internal dynamics they also 
are influenced by outside factors, in the case of Maji Maji obviously by the incoming 
two major world religions. Suggestions of considerable Muslim and Christian 
influence have been made right from the beginning. No doubt some was there; the 
evocation of a God of the Black People carries the same sort of unifying message as 
the universalist world religions. But it is also clear that the rise of the new God was 
based on pre-existing grounds and must have to a great extent been a consequence of 
more spontaneous internal spiritual development. Similarly, maji grew from the 
encounter of indigenous beliefs with all the intruding forces, material and spiritual, 
and its basic nature emerged in this process.  
 
This also helps us to tackle the suggestion that the central point of the maji message 
was what is called ‘nativistic’. Although the connotations of the term may lead one 
astray, I think there is a point here: Maji Maji can indeed be seen as an attempt to 
‘purge the society of unwanted aliens’, a hallmark of such movements.71 True, Maji 
Maji was not as indiscriminately against every single foreigner as the colonialists 
claimed. Sometimes the Indians were spared (as in Madaba), sometimes the 
missionaries (some missions, such as the Anglican one in Masasi and the Lutheran in 
Milo were burned down, but the missionaries were let go unscathed while the 
Catholic mission of Kwiro, a stone’s throw from the Mahenge boma, was not touched 
at all).72 But by and large, those who were understood as colonial agents were 
attacked, and this was done in order to get rid of the colonialists. 
 
Yet Maji Maji should not be seen as an attempt to return to a pre-colonial arcadia. It 
had its hybrid, forward-looking elements which distinguish it from a standard 
nativistic model. Maji itself was physically a concoction of water with a traditional 
grain, millet, and maize, a more recent addition. It was also something that was paid 
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for, and mostly with money, from one to three pesa according to differing 
descriptions. While both Stollowsky and later local cynics claimed that people were 
being deceived by swindlers whose main purpose was to enrich themselves, this 
implied that those who acquired maji must have been involved in the monetary 
economy. Kinjikitile’s claim that ‘God’ had taken the money he had collected may 
perhaps be seen as a reference to a common resource pool. But Maji Maji’s most 
remarkable forward-looking element was its attempt to overcome the intense locality 
of the old society and its quest of God-given unity among the ‘Black People’, i.e. all 
those subjected to colonial tribulations. The dominant nationalist interpretation may 
have played down the role of God and overplayed that of ‘national’ sentiments but it 
realised that the gist of Maji Maji was the emphasis on the search for connection. I 
think this insight has to be safeguarded. 
 
The differences between different zones of rebellion must again be emphasized. 
While the movement grew up and acquired the character of popular resistance in the 
Ngindo-Pogoro-Matumbi-Mwera complex, its nature changed when it was exported 
to more hierarchical societies such as the Mbunga and Ngoni, and forwarded from 
these onwards. There maji was used for more politically instrumental purposes, for 
forging alliances against the common colonial enemy, both within their own societies 
and outwards, towards previously hostile or subjugated African societies. The 
understanding of maji was necessarily different: it was war medicine right from its 
importation. It spread during the first heady weeks of the expansion when it seemed to 
work. It was this stage that it became the medium of communication and symbol of 
alliance. At the same time, its forms changed. In Ungoni, warriors flocked to the 
Luhira river, ‘all drinking of the same water as a sign that they want to take part in the 
war’.73 Later on, when maji had failed in some battles, more of the original ware was 
imported from Ungindo. But at this stage, the Ngoni leaders were so committed that 
they had no way out. If there were any millenarian messages they were rather 
subdued. 
 
And, finally, consequences: not one big one but … 
 
It would be tempting to argue that Maji Maji, and its suppression, must have been the 
big catastrophe that triggered the downward spiral of the South from its former 
prosperity. Some southerners even believe that it led to a colonial ‘hidden agenda’ to 
deliberately leave the South undeveloped, in fear of new resistance.74 While a terrible 
loss of human life is not in doubt, such views suffer from evident weaknesses. To start 
with, the assumption of a former prosperity is questionable: as argued above, the fact 
that these areas exported much and contributed considerable tax income to the 
colonial treasure is an indication of the level of their exploitation rather than that of 
prosperity. Late pre-colonial and early colonial exploitation had seriously depleted the 
natural and human resources of the area. And great, multifaceted historical 
convulsions, such as Maji Maji not only have multiple causes; they also have multiple 
consequences. Some are immediate and visible, others will take shape only gradually 
over time. Some are physically tangible, others work through mediating channels such 
as colonial and postcolonial policies. In the long-term course of history, such 
consequences lose their specific identity and merge with other factors working upon 
these societies. Maji Maji was followed by: a brief stint of a different German policy; 
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the Great European War; British colonialism; and all the postcolonial policies ranging 
from ujamaa and villagization to free market, or laissez faire. Thus we must look at 
the consequences of Maji Maji through the prism of all the subsequent developments. 
 
Devastation and depopulation 
 
What caught the immediate eye was the destruction and loss of human life. The 
contemporary German sources abound with grim descriptions while African oral 
testimonies tell of brutalities of the askari of which even the mildest are revolting. On 
the German side the casualties were counted in hundreds: 15 Europeans, 71 askari, 
316 auxiliaries. On the African side, tens, if not hundreds of thousands of people lost 
their lives, most of them civilians succumbing to famine deliberately unleashed by the 
German military after the operations. The rebels had been destroying crops of those 
who had declined to take maji but by far the worst casualties came from the 
systematic colonialist use of the scorched earth tactic. The result was a three-year 
famine, compared to which all other famines were ‘mere babes… People denied their 
children and wives. It was only those who really loved each other who remained 
together.’75 Some 90 % of the Pangwa were reported to have perished. Of  40,000 
Vidunda some 5,000 survived. The total estimates are bound to remain speculative. 
Gwassa speaks of 250,000 to 300,000 dead – a third of the population in the 
rebellious regions. Iliffe, usually a cool-headed historian, says he ‘may be right’. The 
losses reverberated generations ahead as the famine dented human fertility. A much 
quoted study from Ulanga estimated that some 25 per cent of the next generation 
remained unborn.76 
 
The human losses were real and devastating. Yet three points must be made. First, it is 
simply impossible to know any exact numbers. The death toll may be lower than the 
highest estimates suggest. It is highly likely that many people simply moved away and 
never returned. Secondly, the losses varied from place to place. They were 
particularly heavy in the Matumbi Hills and much of Ngindoland as well, as in parts 
of Ungoni, Upangwa and Uvidunda. Elsewhere they varied more, and were practically 
non-existent in the case of areas that remained outside military activities, such as, it 
will be remembered, most of the densely populated South-Eastern triangle of the 
country South of the Lukuledi river. And thirdly, from our present day vantage point, 
most of these areas must have more than fully recovered long ago in terms of 
population. After all, more than 100 years have now passed. 
 
The recovery has been uneven and taken many forms. There have been spirals both 
upwards and downwards. While some areas may now be better off than they were 
before Maji Maji, for others this is manifestly not the case. Different areas display 
different tendencies. Most of Ungoni seems to be doing quite well. Ruvuma region 
has pockets of poverty but it is now, after some colonial stagnation, one of the major 
maize producing and exporting areas in the country and its development indicators are 
at a safe middle level. The Matumbi Hills, in contrast, continue to be a peripheral and 
neglected area, plagued by internal dissension. The presence of the Government and 
that of Christianity and Islam is more visible and primary education is widely 
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available. Yet in social and economic terms it is difficult to gauge the difference to 
pre-Maji Maji situation. For the Ngindo, Maji Maji can be seen to have marked a 
turning point, and for  the worse. The people, to be sure, may well be more numerous 
now than they were before Maji Maji, depending of course on who is taken as a 
‘Ngindo’. Present-day Liwale is a small but growing township surrounded by a 
number a sizeable villages dotted with a dense mixture of cashew and miombo 
woodland. The post-1990 revival of the cashew economy remains precarious but has 
brought some modest prosperity, as manifested in bicycles, corrugated iron roofs and 
TV sets. Yet the living space of the Ngindo people has been reduced dramatically. 
Maji Maji triggered a series of calamities that finally led to the Ngindo being chased 
from most of their land to make space for the Selous Game Reserve, a huge wildlife 
sanctuary for foreign hunters. Major places like Madaba no longer exist.  
 
Internal changes  
 
Such blows unleashed processes leading to deep internal changes among the Southern 
societies. People moved and settled in new places. Their leaders changed. As so many 
died on the battlefield and the surviving rebel leaders were executed en masse, 
leadership positions went to a younger and differently disposed generation. This was 
most visible among the Ngoni, whose top aristocracy, some 84 people, were hanged 
by the Germans in Songea in early 1906. Maji Maji basically destroyed the Ngoni 
military society and did much to level out the old distinction between aristocrats and 
subjects. New chiefs were appointed not only from the educated sons of the old ones 
but also from subject Ndendeuli peoples. Changes were equally marked elsewhere. 
Among the Ngindo and Matumbi, whole clans died out. The execution of some 200 
warriors wiped out the Vidunda leadership. Although some members of Mbeyela’s 
family changed their names the Germans distributed their territory to new leaders, 
some indigenous and others brought from outside.77  
 
New ideas produced a new mindset. Not only Kolelo and Bokero but the new God 
had been shown unable to save their black children. If a religion is something that 
deals with a ‘culturally postulated non-falsifiable reality’,78 maji had definitely failed 
as religion. Its place was overtaken by Christianity and Islam. Christianity advanced 
especially in the West, in the secondary zone of the rebellion, and in its peripheries. It 
was given a major boost in Ungoni when the missionaries came back in tandem with 
the German military and some of the Ngoni leaders sentenced to execution, including 
Mputa, assented to be baptized before hanging.79 However, not without some doubt. 
One of the chiefs being prepared for the gallows asked the missionary Father 
Johannes whether he really would rise again after babtism.80 In any case, missionary 
schools were reopened and people flocked to them. Christianity also made headway 
around Mahenge, where the Kwiro mission had been spared from destruction, and in 
Ubena. In the East, the primary core of Maji Maji, the Ngindo and the Mwera turned 
                                                          
77 Iliffe, Modern History, p. 200; Mapunda and Mpangara, Maji Maji War, pp. 22-23; Gwassa, 
Outbreak, p. 389; Nyagava, Bena, pp. 145-49. 
78 Thomas D. Blakely et al. (eds), Religion in Africa. London, 1994, p. 1, as quoted by Yusufu Q. Lawi 
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79 Kigonsera Chronicle, 17 Feb 1906, extract in Gwassa and Iliffe, Documents, 25-26; Walter, God’s 
Faithfulness,  pp.171-172; Mapunda and Mpangara, Maji Maj War, pp. 21-22. 
80 Walter, God’s Faithfulness, p. 172. 
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to Islam.81 Christianity is told to have become a taboo among the Ngindo, who 
believed that by killing a bishop they had estranged themselves from the God of the 
Christians.82 What happened to the old spirits is unclear; they hardly disappeared 
altogether but their public role was strongly reduced. The new spiritual configuration 
paved the way for more instrumentalist beliefs in the guise of witchcraft. Between the 
wars witchcraft and witchcraft eradication movements became ‘an integral feature’ of 
Tanzanian life. Witchcraft has remained widespread although it has taken ever more 
individualized and syncreticized forms.83 The Bokero spirit himself is reported to 
have moved downstream towards the delta of Rufiji and become islamized there.84  
 
Maji had sought connection and unity; its suppression spread discord. Maji had failed 
and its advocates were accused of deception. Matumbi elders sang of ‘the swindle of 
Kinjikitile’. ‘Kinjala led me astray,’ were the last words of the chief Mputa before he 
was hanged.85 The top leaders who escaped the German gallows died in the hands of 
their fellow Africans: Kinjala was captured by Ngindo loyalists and killed himself; 
Chabruma was murdered by his Yao allies. The Ngindo and the Matumbi were 
considered as the chief troublemakers as they had started the whole thing. For them, 
conversion was a way to claim a new identity. ‘I am a Muslim, not a Ngindo’, it was 
said in Liwale in 1908.86 Half a century later, when Julius Nyerere drew on the maji 
message in mobilizing support for the independence movement, the failure of maji 
was still vividly remembered on the ground. For Nyerere, a British-educated 
Northerner, Maji Maji was a ‘response to a natural call … ringing in the hearts of all 
men … to rebel against foreign domination’. Many elders in the South were less sure. 
When the Tanganyika African National Union started to spread its message and 
dispatch its men to the regions, they asked: was this not like Maji Maji began and 
didn’t we fail to drive the European away?87 Yet, in retrospect in can be argued that 
Maji Maji, even in its failure, in the long run helped to bring the peoples in Southern 
Tanzania closer together; in particular, the Ngoni were now more in line with the 
other African peoples. 
 
From extractive to developmental colonialism 
 
Other changes came about through policies, and some major policy changes can be 
traced back to Maji Maji. At the country level, as is well known, German colonial 
policies changed after the rebellion. It may not have been the kind of complete 
transition from excessive use of force to the ‘scientific colonialism’ as trumpeted in 
colonial ideology. The actual policies that followed Maji Maji changed more slowly 
and in a more contradictory manner than the public rhetoric of the top colonial rulers. 
But avoiding a new rebellion became the loadstar of policy. There was a general 
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extension of a more organized state apparatus throughout the country, including the 
ex-rebel areas. The Matumbi did away with the akidas and received a German staff 
sergeant instead. More importantly, there was also a strengthening of the existing 
developmental elements in colonial practice at the expense of the extractive practices.  
 
To appreciate this argument we need some background. If we at all associate 
‘colonialism’ with ‘development’ we usually think of late, post Second World War 
colonialism with its currency boards and self-confessed development programmes. 
For quite a while my larger argument has been that development, understood as 
intended economic and social change, is a much earlier phenomenon: something that 
emerged from the exigencies of early colonialism.88 It does not necessarily make 
colonialism less oppressive and it certainly does not make it less exploitative. Surely 
development was not the aim of the Germans when they embarked on their colonial 
adventure in the 1880s; they simply were driven to it. The inner logic of conquest and 
exploitation made them develop their new possessions. Colonialism meant 
development for exploitation: resources had to be developed before they could be 
exploited. This was perfectly clear to the contemporaries; only our later development 
discourse with its identification of development with ‘good’ in a moral sense, has lost 
it. Yet, development was not simply or only a means to exploitation. What makes it 
possible to regard development as morally good is that it confers justification on the 
same exploitation it requires. Development can also be seen as a goal with inherently 
positive and desirable value content: its promise is that if we develop resources and 
exploit them it will lead to a social process at the end of which awaits something we 
again call development – Millennium Development Goals, prosperity, or power.  
 
I suggest that colonialism in Tanzania can be understood as having been transformed 
from ‘exploitation without development’ to ‘development for exploitation’ and Maji 
Maji can be seen as a major factor facilitating the emergence of ‘developmental 
colonialism’. The rebellion and its aftermath gave a final death blow to what remained 
of the predatory economy. Thereafter, the efforts at colonial development were given 
much more attention and shaped into a coherent programme. There was no longer any 
doubt that the colony was to be developed; the question was how and for whose 
benefit, as there were different lines competing within German colonialism, some 
favouring German settlers, others plantations and African cash crops production.  I 
would argue that what Maji Maji did was that it very much accelerated the shift from 
a basically extractive and largely trade-based colonial policy to a more developmental 
one - developmental in the modern sense of the word, combining intentional 
intervention with high-sounding purposes. It goes without saying that this it was not a 
total shift: some elements of the developmental regime were there right from the 
beginning; some elements of the extractive mode, especially the widespread use of 
plain force in labour recruitment, lingered on. Yet by and large, German colonialism 
went into the developmental mode much earlier than is generally recognized, and the 
British fitfully carried it onwards.  
 
Development and neglect  
 
How then does it fit into this argument that the South of Tanzania is still so 
underdeveloped, or understood as such, and the recovery from Maji Maji has been so 
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uneven? Two elements offer an answer. Firstly, policies are crucially dependent on 
how they are implemented, or not implemented, in practice. When colonialism went 
into a more developmental mode, the southern areas – largely those in one way or 
another connected with Maji Maji – were left outside the developmental drive and 
were broadly neglected. During the British colonial period, the neglect only deepened. 
The British in general were much less disposed to developing Tanganyika as their 
colonial possession than the Germans had been. There was much less pressure from 
the centre, and development initiatives locally in the South became crucially 
dependent on single officials and their changing whims. And they changed often; 
Liwale district, for instance, had 27 district commissioners during the first 26 years of 
British rule.89 The neglect – and the administrative unattractiveness - has continued to 
these days. That is, here I agree with the thesis of colonial and postcolonial neglect, 
and some of its origins can paradoxically be traced to Maji Maji, which at the general 
level contributed so much towards a more active developmental policy.  
 
Development in this context means the construction of railways and roads, the 
introduction of new crops and cultivation methods, the extension of missionary and 
colonial education, and the improvement of rudimentary health services. In the South, 
devastation apparent in the immediate aftermath of Maji Maji seemed to provide little 
potential for such efforts. There had been a plan to build a railway across the South 
from Kilwa to Lake Nyasa, paralleling those that were constructed from the coast to 
Kigoma and Arusha. It was scrapped by the Germans and never revived by the 
British. The neglect has continued long into the postcolonial period. A proper all-
weather road from Dar es Salaam to Mtwara has been under construction in bits and 
pieces for some 30 years and is yet to be finished.90 No systematic introduction of 
new cash crops was ever attempted after the ill-fated German cotton efforts – the 
cashew economy started to grow only in the 1930s and it was entirely market-led, 
spurred by intensifying demand from India.91 Much of the education and health care 
was left to the missionaries in the South. The missionaries, including the Germans, 
returned, but missionary activities remained concentrated in a relatively few 
strongholds over a vast area.  
 
Secondly, part of the answer can be found in a host of other, only partially, if at all, 
policy-related factors which affect the workings of societies. The Southern 
underdevelopment is no sui generis; the difference between the rest of the country is 
that of degree and not of kind. Despite colonial and postcolonial development efforts, 
most of Tanzania, a few pockets of affluence notwithstanding, remains 
underdeveloped or impoverished; the South may not even be the worst part.92 The 
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postcolonial development interventions have not been able to overcome the other 
forces that produce effects to the contrary of the proclaimed aims. Partly this is 
because though the goals of postcolonial development differ from those of colonial 
development the means remain much the same. Although the ideology of colonial 
development is now duly condemned and transcended, many of its forms continue to 
be relied upon in differing guises. For instance, building infrastructure – one of the 
basics of colonial development – continues to be necessary for economic 
development; but it does not automatically lead to it. It can also lead to intensified 
exploitation without development, depending on the broader socio-economic context 
in which it takes place. 
 
One of the most striking differences between the rebel area as it was then and as it is 
now is that almost half of it has been emptied of local people and human life. Where 
Ngindo and other people lived in settlements of varying size, where caravans of 
porters travelled along well-established trade routes, and where the maji message was 
spread, there is now the Selous Game Reserve.93 With its 55,000 square kilometres it 
is not only the largest wildlife reserve in Tanzania, but also in Africa, and one of the 
largest protected areas in the world. Its former inhabitants have been moved away and 
resettled. A huge chunk of ‘wilderness’ has thus been created. Roads are blocked in 
the middle of nowhere and the places surrounding the vast area have been turned into 
peripheral cul-de-sacs. Formerly closely interacting and settled peoples such as the 
Ngindo and the Pogoro are effectively separated – the former were pushed to the 
Liwale side, the latter to the Mahenge side. While the Selous is off-limits to local 
people and is advertised as one of last ‘remaining’ wild areas in Africa, it is far from 
empty and little if anything there is ‘original’. It is accessible to people with enough 
foreign exchange. Its northern edge is reserved for ‘common’ tourists with cameras, 
and more lodges are being built for them. The area south of Rufiji is the economic 
mainstay of the reserve. It has been devoted to lucrative trophy hunting of big game, 
divided into hunting blocks and rented to mostly foreign hunting companies in a 
complicated web of business, patronage and outright corruption.94  
 
The creation of the Selous was a long drawn-out process, extending over almost 80 
years. Maji Maji was one but decisive moment in it.95 Although the first, small game 
reserves were established north of Rufiji by the Germans as early as 1896, the reserve 
was expanded only gradually to its present size. The major extensions were carried 
out by the British from the 1930s to the 1950s. They stemmed from many 
motivations. The colonial game officers tried first to protect the elephant populations 
and, when they recovered, control their increasing numbers. The colonial 
administrators continued to experience the Ngindo as difficult to administer, 
‘especially with regard to tax collection’. And colonial medical authorities were 
concerned with apparent outbreaks of sleeping sickness. From the early 1930s 
onwards, the authorities realised that elephants multiplied rapidly. A drive started to 
eliminate them along the coast and corral them towards the west while trying to 
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prevent them from wreaking havoc on people’s shambas. A ‘voluntary’ relocation of 
the inhabitants would have facilitated this but most refused. Pressure was put on them 
by gradually extending the borders of the reserve while leaving the people therein 
unprotected. Many moved on their own. The game officers came to the conclusion 
that both human and animal interests were best served by the creation of a big enough 
uninhabited area, and the administrators agreed from their own point of view. When a 
sleeping-sickness outbreak occurred nearby in the early 1940s it gave the Provincial 
Commissioner a pretext to go forward with his total evacuation plan. He confessed to 
the belief that the ‘only solution for the betterment of Liwale district and its people 
[was] its elimination’. Although the implementation of the plan was slow and poor, 
thousands were officially relocated to concentrations on both sides of the reserve. 
Thousands others ‘vanished in the night’ before the government lorries came.96 One 
of the places wiped off of the map was Madaba, emptied in 1945. Thus the ground 
was cleared for a major extension of the Selous. It was left to the postcolonial 
government in the 1960s and 1970s, with foreign exchange revenue in mind, to 
complete the job by adjusting the borders. 
 
The story would have been very different without Maji Maji. Scholarly opinions 
differ as to whether the area teemed with wildlife earlier, or whether there rather was 
a scarcity of wildlife, and if so, whether it was a temporary one caused by devastating 
panzootics or a more permanent feature. There is no doubt, however, that predators 
greatly increased in numbers after the suppression of Maji Maji decimated the 
population and scattered the survivors.97 In the Matumbi Hills, ‘before the war the 
population was very dense and it was very difficult to find a piece of land on which to 
grow food … Now, alas, you see only bush everywhere.’ Ngindoland also suffered a 
three-year famine when people went into hiding and were unable to cultivate. The 
Ngindo probably were some 50,000 before the rebellion. They had been mostly living 
along the fertile river valleys, which left most of the land unsettled. They were also 
used to moving their homesteads relatively frequently. But their presence in strategic 
locations obviously kept wildlife and tsetse at bay, and the decimation of more than 
half and the dispersal of much of the rest of the human population in the Maji Maji 
aftermath opened the way for man-eating lions, growing hordes of elephants and the 
advancing tsetse fly. While Maji Maji probably was the major blow, its effects were 
exacerbated by the requisitioning of porterage, labour and food by the warring 
European armies during their subsequent mutual war, less than ten short years after 
Maji Maji. Many Ngindos, again, abandoned their homesteads and moved into the 
bush. Wild animals and flies regained the initiative.98   
 
I have argued above that one of the forces of underdevelopment in the South has been 
colonial and postcolonial neglect. This can also been seen as a blessing in disguise; 
paradoxically, it has also protected some of the major natural resources of the South. 
There still seems to be much land and much forest in the South. Newcomers are often 
surprised at the extent of uninhabited space playing the ‘symphony of green foliage 
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and blue sky’, particularly during the wet season.99 Of course, few if any places and 
forests are ‘intact’ in the sense that they would have remained untouched by human 
influence. The forests near settlements and roads have long been used for domestic 
purposes and commercial logging of the most valuable species has been a long-
standing practice. A recent inventory classified most forests in Liwale and Tunduru 
districts as ‘degraded’ and those in Rufiji, Kilwa and Nachingwea districts as ‘heavily 
degraded’. But compared with the rest of the country, the southern regions from Rufiji 
to Lindi and Mtwara and Tunduru in Songea are relatively well forested. Southern 
Tanzania is in fact home to some of the largest remaining stands of miombo woodland 
in whole of Africa. Miombo with its dominating shortish Brachystegia-Julberdarnia 
species may seem modest to a layperson’s eye but it contains many commercially 
valuable trees, while the coastal forests of the South are of great biodiversity 
importance.100 
 
Now this long neglect, originating from the time of Maji Maji, is coming to an end: 
only 60 kilometres of the Dar es Salaam – Mtwara road remains unpaved. This means 
that the protection provided by neglect is coming to an end as well. The global biofuel 
boom increased the value of land even in Tanzania. More than 640,000 ha of land had 
been transferred to foreign investors for production of biofuels, much of it in Lindi 
and Mtwara regions which are regarded as most promising for biofuels.101 The 
demand for African timber has considerably increased during the last years, especially 
from China, and the logging frontier is moving down to the South. The way the 
timber trade is presently organized brings little benefit to local people or the 
Tanzanian state. The value chain leaves the local harvester with hardly one per cent of 
the export price. Most of the logging is illegal and evades taxes and royalties. 
According to the calculations, only 4 % of the revenues due to the state are actually 
collected. Officials at all levels are involved in relations of patronage and bribery with 
businessmen. This new system of extractive exploitation has been greatly facilitated 
by infrastructure development, especially the opening the Mkapa Bridge over Rufiji in 
2003. The effects of the logging boom have been greatest in Rufiji and Kilwa 
districts.102 Further South they have been less felt, and some of the pressure may have 
been temporarily relieved by the global economic crisis. When the road is there and 
the easy areas elsewhere have been exhausted, however, there is little doubt that the 




There are many features in Maji Maji which we do not and probably will never know 
and understand. Its nature, causes and consequences are justifiably seen in many 
different ways, and as our ‘power’ requirements change so do our interpretations and 
assessments. The monolithic ‘statist’ interpretations are eroding and giving way to a 
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postcolonialist predilection for seeing Maji Maji as a contingent collection of local 
uprisings and struggles. It has been the broad argument of this article that this is not 
the only possible way of reinterpreting Maji Maji. I have suggested that it can also be 
understood as a socio-religious movement, manifesting itself in a chain of struggles 
interconnected under the maji umbrella. In this view, Maji Maji appears as a loose and 
internally differentiated mass movement which emerged from a confluence of 
extreme colonial exploitation along with the ferment of new spiritual ideas springing 
from an ancient water cult. Its most remarkable feature was its search for an anti-
colonial connection, in the guise of the advent of a God of the ‘Black People’; and 
what millenarian or apocalyptic tones it may have had sprang from the social and 
political configuration of the early colonial system of exploitation. More tentatively 
and speculatively, I have also suggested that the movement may have acquired its 
basic nature rather late and continued to develop along with the unfolding events: the 
crucial incubation period may have been the few weeks’ interregnum from the first 
‘disturbances’ at the Matumbi Hills to onset of the systematic colonial military 
backlash, including the first heady weeks of rebel military successes. Its nature seems 
to have changed from a more broad-based social movement to a more political and 
strategic one when it was exported from its primary core areas to the secondary zones 
in South-West and North. There maji became more a symbol of a political alliance. Its 
brutal suppression led not only to a terrible loss of human life but a fundamental 
rethinking of cultural and political values. 
  
The consequences of Maji Maji were as contradictory and varied as it was itself. It 
facilitated the spread of new ideas and taught some healthy disrespect towards 
hyperbole in politics.103 It contributed to the emergence of a new, more active and 
developmental colonial policy but neglected those areas which participated in it, 
leaving them outside the developmental drive. After more than 100 years, the areas 
involved recovered but very unevenly, and the partial protection lent by the neglect of 
Southern natural resources is coming to an end. Where Maji Maji failed the 
independence movement triumphed; but the postcolonial policies have been unable to 
solve the basic dilemmas of development and exploitation. Their dialectics continues. 
While colonial exploitation is now duly condemned and transcended, many of its 
main means in colonial development continue to be relied upon, and the consequences 
may be much the same. In today’s political and economic context in the South of 
Tanzania, new infrastructure does not seem to lead to economic development but 
rather to intensified exploitation of natural resources without their development.  
 
Maji Maji failed partly because of its spontaneous and ad hoc nature, while the 
independence movement won because of its organization and discipline; but also the 
international environment and the possibilities allowed by it were entirely different. In 
any case, one can argue that maji was bound to fail because it was based on promises 
the major ones of which had no credence in the material world – they could be 
falsified all too manifestly. But to prove it took a terrible toll. Combining the lessons 
of Maji Maji with those of the subsequent development history of Tanzania, one can 
perhaps suggest that if it is harder to fight poverty and underdevelopment than foreign 
rule, it is not only because the mechanisms are more subtle and the agents are more 
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difficult to identify but also because it is so difficult to judge in advance whose 
promises will turn out to be hollow and what it will take to find this out. 
